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COMBATING FAKE NEWS IN SOCIAL 
MEDIA:  U.S. AND GERMAN LEGAL 
APPROACHES 
RYAN KRASKI† 
INTRODUCTION 
In searching for a means to combat fake news, one will most 
likely come across a wide variety of options that have nothing to 
do with the law.  Recommendations that journalists heighten 
their standards or that their audiences consume news more 
critically are commonplace.  Fake news is, in and of itself, worthy 
of being eradicated; it misleads the public discourse on any 
number of topics, injures reputations, misleads consumers, and is 
often done so with impunity.  But, this Article does not concern 
these general societal concerns or humanities-based methods; 
this Article approaches only the narrow category where fake 
news creates legally recognizable injuries for individuals or 
society as a whole.  Arising out of these intrusions into personal 
rights and collective laws is a large body of preexisting law 
capable of combating fake news both in Germany and the United 
States.1 
“Fake news” refers to untrue stories, factually warped 
reports, or otherwise nonexistent events which represent 
“statements of fact” as being real, that is, not parody or some 
form of opinion, in a pseudo-journalistic manner.  The most 
fundamental element of fake news is that the stories make 
 
† B.A. Business Administration and Political Science 2011 cum laude, 
Washington and Jefferson College; J.D. 2014 cum laude, Duquesne University 
School of Law, doctoral candidate Universität zu Köln. Admitted to practice law in 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and U.S. Federal Courts of the Third Circuit; 
currently a lecturer of Tort Law at Universität zu Köln in Cologne, Germany. 
1 Note that the legal confrontation of fake news can summon a number of 
different legal areas including, but not limited to: Tort Law, Criminal Law, 
Intellectual Property Law, Commercial Law, Election Law, as well as Constitutional 
Law. Due to the extensive discussion deserved in all of these areas, some, such as 
Commercial, Election and Intellectual Property Law are not generally covered, but 
may be still mentioned when relevant to other included areas. 
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assertions which are not based on objectively verifiable fact.  This 
sort of “reporting” shall be referred to as fake news regardless of 
whether its deceptiveness arises intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly.2 
The impact of the recent social media revolution cannot be 
understated; it is estimated that there are 2.46 billion social 
media users worldwide.3  These users can communicate with one 
another and generate content, often in the form of text, photos, 
audio files, and videos.4  There is a broad array of social media: 
social networks such as Facebook serve as communication 
platforms, instant messengers such as WhatsApp allow for 
groups to be instantly contacted en masse, blogs allow content 
generation and commentary from users, wikis are websites 
collectively edited by users, webfora are virtual discussion rooms 
for particular topics, and review websites allow users to provide 
commentary on goods, services, other people.5 
Fake news is nothing new; the early Catholic Church 
punished defamation as a sin as early as the fourth century.6  In 
ninth century England, slanderers’ tongues could be cut out as a 
punishment.7  Defamation laws started to come into their modern 
form following the fifteenth century invention of the printing 
press and the expanded flow of information that accompanied it.8  
With the advent of new technologies, defamation and other 
speech-oriented causes of action have evolved alongside.  Many of  
 
 
2 Recovery may be available following a negligently made false statement, but 
this is not within the central focus of this Article. 
3 Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2021, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-
users/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). 
4 Jennifer Alejandro, Journalism in the Age of Social Media 3 (2010) 
(unpublished Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford), http://reuter 
sinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/Journalism%2520in%252
0the%2520Age%2520of%2520Social%2520Media.pdf. 
5 ROLF SCHWARTMANN & SARA OHR, RECHT DER SOZIALEN MEDIEN 7–11 (2015). 
6 Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 
COLUM. L. REV. 546, 550 (1903). 
7 Id. at 549 (noting the policy of the English King Alfred). 
8 Id. at 547–48; see id. at 555 (explaining that early remedies against 
defamation were first provided in order to suppress dueling, which had been a 
common means for vindication); see also Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 
35 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 17, 25–26 (2011) (explaining that, during the Middle Ages, 
defamatory statements practically always occurred through spoken word, thus first 
giving birth to the claim for slander; its counterpart, libel, came into existence after 
the creation of the printing press). 
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these traditional concepts can be implemented to combat the 
propagation of fake news in social media, but, in a number of 
cases, the law will, once again, require an evolution. 
When asking how fake news in social media can be combated 
under U.S. and German law, one must first take the systems’ 
most fundamental differences into consideration.  U.S. law is 
characterized by its federal structure, the interaction of state 
laws often with the federal, U.S. Constitution, usage of pretrial 
discovery, as well as the role of juries in calculating damages.9  In 
contrast, Germany, as a civil law system, is characterized by its 
usage of separate legal actions to acquire information, lack of 
pretrial discovery, and broader array of available remedies, none 
of which allow for punitive damages.10  Through a brief analysis 
of these systems’ procedures, causes of action, and remedies, it 
will become apparent that the U.S. system takes an approach 
leading to more frequent and higher value damage awards.  
Germany, in contrast, makes greater usage of its other available 
remedies.  This Article sets out to demonstrate the available 
legal tools for combating fake news in social media. 
I. BACKGROUND TO FAKE NEWS 
A. Syrian Refugee Defamed in German Social Media 
In September 2015, a Syrian refugee in Berlin took a “selfie” 
with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.11  Following the 2016 
terrorist bombings in Brussels and attempt by a number of young 
refugee men in Berlin to set a homeless man on fire, this selfie 
was edited by anonymous Internet users and posted on 
Facebook.12  The edits and captions falsely reported that this 
young man, pictured with Chancellor Merkel, was a terrorist 
involved in these horrendous acts.13  He brought suit against 
Facebook seeking an injunction, demanding Facebook remove 
any content connecting him to terrorist activities.14 
 
9 Alexander Bruns, Access to Media Sources in Defamation Litigation in the 
United States and Germany, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283, 283–84 (2000). 
10 Id. 
11 LG Würzburg March 7, 2017, 11 O 2338/16 UVR, http://www.gesetze-bayern.d 
e/Content/Document/Y-300-Z-BECKRS-B-2017-N-103822?hl=true. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
FINAL_KRASKI 6/16/2018 11:24 AM 
926 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:923   
In denying the merits of his claim against Facebook, the 
Würzburg District Court made clear that social media networks, 
such as Facebook, are typically neither content creators nor 
collaborators in specific acts of defamation.15  Thus, functioning 
only as service providers, in the context of the German 
Teleservices Act, service providers cannot be obligated to 
proactively search through all of the content published on their 
platforms and to delete content that is defamatory, or otherwise 
affecting an individual’s rights.16  Furthermore, providers are not 
obligated to create the complex and costly systems to monitor 
content and prevent future publications, as the plaintiff 
requested.17  Only upon notification by the injured party to the 
provider that there is a specific instance of illegal content posted 
is the provider obliged to remove the content.18 
B. Pizzagate 
In the midst of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
Americans took to social media to debate any number of political 
issues, as well as to inform themselves about the candidates.  
Sometime around October 2016, anonymous Twitter accounts 
began posting, falsely, that former democratic politician Anthony 
Weiner’s laptop was recovered by the FBI, and that it contained 
proof of his involvement in child sexual abuse.19  The online 
rumors spread further to engulf Hillary Clinton, as well as her 
campaign manager John Podesta.20  Mr. Podesta’s emails were 
hacked and published on WikiLeaks; online conspiracy theorists 
were quick to draw a connection between his frequent references 
to “pizza” and “cheese” and their belief that it was code words for 
pedophile activities.21  Eventually, the rumors progressed to the 
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. (citing Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 
179, § 10 (Ger.)). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Andrew Griffin, What is Pizzagate? The Hillary Clinton Conspiracy Theory 
that Led to a Man Opening Fire in a Restaurant, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 5, 2016, 12:31 
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/pizzagate-what-
is-it-explained-hillary-clinton-paedophile-conspiracy-gunman-fake-news-
a7456681.html. 
20 Id. 
21 James Alefantis, What Happened When ‘Pizzagate’ Came to My Restaurant, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pizzagate-
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point of suggesting that Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Podesta, and a number 
of others were running a child-slavery ring out of the basement of 
a Washington D.C. pizzeria, Comet Ping Pong.22  Beyond the chat 
rooms and other social media platforms playing host to this 
conspiracy theory, a number of “alt-right” oriented broadcasters, 
such as Alex Jones, propagated these lies.23 
Comet’s owner was inundated with death threats, service 
review websites were flooded with extremely negative reviews, 
their telephone line was constantly tied up with harassing calls 
until they unplugged it entirely, the workers’ photos and home 
addresses were posted on social media, labeling them as 
criminals, not to mention the harassment inflicted on their 
friends and families.24  On December 4, 2016, Edgar Maddison 
Welch walked into the pizzeria wielding both a loaded AR-15 rifle 
and .38 caliber pistol.25  After firing off three shots and then 
pointing his weapons at some employees, Mr. Welch peacefully 
surrendered himself to the police.26  He later admitted that he 
was persuaded by the conspiracy theorists’ calls for “self-
investigation.”27  This disastrous outcome was met mostly by 
conspiracy theorists doubling-down on their false assertions, as 
well as an apathetic apology by online protagonist Alex Jones.28  
Even as long as a year later, defamatory reviews and inciting 
online theories can still be readily found. 
C. Role of the Countries’ Constitutions 
The United States Constitution and the German 
Constitution (“German Basic Law”) function somewhat 
differently.  As a foundational principle, the U.S. Constitution 
conforms to the “state action doctrine,” enabling and restraining 
 
taught-us-the-value-of-community/2017/04/19/92cae67c-23b0-11e7-bb9d-
8cd6118e1409_story.html?utm_term=.a70236c54eee. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Welch, No. U16036846 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 5, 2016).  
26 Id. 
27 Alefantis, supra note 21. 
28 Mack Lamoureux, Alex Jones Is Very, Very Sorry for that Pizzagate Stuff, 
VICE (Mar. 25, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/alex-jones-is-very-
very-sorry-for-that-pizzagate-stuff. 
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government powers.29   These “negative” rights do not control the 
conduct of private individuals or organizations, but, rather, some 
form of government wrongdoing.30  In other words, “only the state 
can violate an individual’s constitutional rights.”31  Because of 
the state-action requirement, plaintiffs wishing to enforce 
individual rights must first establish that the wrongdoer was a 
public actor, that is, he was performing either an act on behalf of 
the state or one that would be traditionally carried out by the 
state.32  While the German Basic Law, on its face, also requires 
state action, the courts have extended some causes of action 
arising under the Basic Law to be accessible by private plaintiffs 
(mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte).33  This means that 
injured plaintiffs may be able to invoke constitutional rights 
against other private individuals.34  Furthermore, the “positive 
rights” arising under the German Basic Law can require the 
state to take specific action in some instances.35 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”36  But this provision only 
provides individual protection against laws made by “Congress,” 
the federal legislature.  In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified and states, in relevant part, that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”37  In Whitney v. California, Justice 
Brandeis further elaborated that “all fundamental rights 
comprised within the term liberty are protected by the federal  
 
 
29 John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 569, 575 (2005). 
30 Id. But see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery and involuntary 
servitude; this is the only “positive” right found in the U.S. Constitution). 
31 Joshua Crawford, Note, Importing German Defamation Principles: A 
Constitutional Right of Reply, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 769 (2014). 
32 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
33 BVerfG, Jan. 15, 1958, BVerfGE 7, 198 (Ger.), http://germanlawarchive.iusco 
mp.org/?p=51. 
34 Crawford, supra note 31, at 769. 
35 Id. 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
FINAL_KRASKI 6/16/2018 11:24 AM 
2017] COMBATING FAKE NEWS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 929 
Constitution from invasion by the states.  The right of free 
speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of 
course, fundamental rights.”38 
The Supreme Court made it clear that not all speech is of 
equal importance; speech concerning “public issues” is regarded 
as the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values,” and is afforded special protection accordingly.39  “In 
contrast . . . matters of purely private concern [are] of less First 
Amendment concern.”40  Speech on purely private matters does 
not garner the same level of constitutional protection as speech 
on matters of public interest, because “ ‘there is no threat to the 
free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential 
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas’; and the ‘threat 
of liability’ does not pose the risk of a ‘reaction of self-censorship’ 
on matters of public import.”41  It is this initial public-private 
distinction that determines the level of protection afforded by the 
First Amendment as a defense against all speech-oriented 
claims. 
In addition to analyzing the government’s attempts to 
regulate the content of speech, its attempts to restrict speech 
prior to, simultaneously with, or subsequent to the actual speech 
must also be taken into consideration.  All of the following laws 
have been found to be unconstitutional: prior restraints on 
speech, requiring a permit at the outset,42 the impoundment of 
receipt or royalty proceeds, burdening the speaker,43 the 
subsequent issuance of civil damages for speech regarding a 
public official,44 as well as the speaker being subject to criminal 
penalties without inciting an “imminent lawless action.”45  These 
forms of restriction on speech have consistently been struck 
down, but the First Amendment’s “fullest and most urgent 
 
38 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
39 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) 
(quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)). 
40 Id. 
41 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 
472 U.S. at 760). 
42 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 165–66, 168 (2002). 
43 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 108, 123 (1991). 
44 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
45 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
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application” is saved for political discourse.46  Citizens’ right “to 
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information,” while 
informing themselves on political choices, “is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect 
it.”47  The First Amendment functions with an inherent mistrust 
of government power, thus explaining why courts are often quick 
to strike down restrictions on speech disfavoring certain subjects 
or viewpoints.48  Laws burdening political speech are “subject to 
strict scrutiny,” placing the burden on the government to prove 
that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”49  While restrictions 
imposing on “fundamental rights” and “suspect classes” of 
persons will almost always be struck down under strict scrutiny, 
the courts apply a lower standard to other forms of speech.  
Restrictions affecting commercial speech, for example, are 
scrutinized by the courts under the “rational basis test,” 
requiring that the individual first plead an infringement of their 
rights, and then the government, to show only that its law is “a 
rational way of furthering any legitimate governmental 
purpose.”50  The rational basis standard is very lenient, and 
nearly every law scrutinized under it is upheld.51 
III. ESSENTIAL FREE SPEECH ARTICLES OF THE GERMAN BASIC 
LAW 
Article 5 of the German Basic Law is comparable to the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.52  Article 5, 
paragraph 1 sets forth that “[e]very person shall have the right 
freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing 
and pictures . . . . Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting 
 
46 Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (citing 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
47 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). 
48 Id.; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000) (striking down a content-based restriction); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (prohibiting restrictions that distinguished among 
different speakers and allowed speech by some but not others). 
49 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007). 
50 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 799 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
51 Id. 
52 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 5, translation at https://www.gesetze-im 
-internet.de/englisch_gg/. 
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by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There 
shall be no censorship.”53  Its limitations can be found in Article 
5, paragraph 2, which states that “[t]hese rights shall find their 
limits in the provisions of general laws . . . and in the right to 
personal honor.”54  In addition to the freedom of speech, the 
German Basic Law grants certain other rights not found in the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Some of the important differences between the U.S. 
Constitution and German Basic Law can be found in the Basic 
Law’s first two articles.  The Basic Law’s Article 1, which sets 
forth the inviolable protection of human dignity and human 
rights, is fundamental and interwoven with other individual 
protections.55  Article 2 states:  “Every person shall have the right 
to free development of his personality insofar as he does not 
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or the moral law.”56  These are unique German rights 
arising out of the country’s recent history. 
A. General Personality Rights 
Following World War II, and with the fresh memory of its 
state-sponsored horrors, the drafters of the German Basic Law 
enshrined the protection of human dignity as one of the highest 
legal priorities.57  Article 1’s protection of human dignity and 
human rights permeates the Basic Law, also providing the basis 
for the general protection of personality rights (allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht).58  These general rights interpreted out of 
the Basic Law through Civil Code § 823 paragraph 1 should be 
distinguished from statutory rights enforced through § 823 
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code; these will be discussed 
subsequently.59  While the typical expectation in a civil law 
 
53 Id. art. 5, para. 1. 
54 Id. art. 5, para. 2. 
55 Id. art. 1. 
56 Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
57 Nicole Jacoby, Redefining the Right To Be Let Alone: Privacy Rights and the 
Constitutionality of Technical Surveillance Measures in Germany and the United 
States, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433, 454 (2007). 
58 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, para. 1, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3489 (Ger.); 
accord GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 2, para. 1; id. art. 1, para. 1. 
59 See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, para. 2 (allowing 
for civil liability to arise out of criminal, and other, statutes within the purview of 
paragraph 2). 
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system is that the law sprouts from legislative codification, 
Germany’s protection of personality rights had a rather 
anomalous development through the Federal Supreme Court and 
Federal Constitutional Court’s interpretations of the Basic Law, 
as well as the Civil Code.60  Because the German Civil Code is 
silent on the protection of general personality rights, the Federal 
Supreme Court took the first steps in the 1954 Schacht decision 
to create civil liability for personality right infringements.61  A 
newspaper’s selective quotations from an author led to a 
publication that was misleading as to the author’s opinions.62  
Upon review, the Court determined that the Basic Law’s Articles 
1 and 2 ought to be construed as substantive rights under the 
Civil Code.63  The Schacht court, recognizing this right, allowed 
for the remedy of retraction.64  Subsequent court decisions have 
dismissed the notion that the right of personality is a mechanism 
for the individual to control his public perception; rather, it is a 
tool for correcting false and misleading facts concerning an 
individual.65 
Among the numerous types of rights identified under the 
general personality rights, perhaps protection of the individual 
honor (Ehrenschutz) is the most fundamental.  Protection of the 
personal honor was formally recognized as being part of the 
general protection of personality rights in the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s 1980 Eppler decision.66  Prior to this, the 
individual honor was protected through Criminal Code provisions 
such as § 185’s punishment for insults (Beleidigung).67  The 
modern civil remedy primarily protects from violations of the 
 
60 Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser's Privacy and the German 
Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1925, 1947 (2010). 
61 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [First Civil 
Division] May 25, 1954, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1404, 1954 
(Ger.). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 60, at 1951 n.173 (noting the landmark 
Caroline von Monaco case). 
66 BVerfG, 1 BvR 185/77, Mar. 6, 1980, https://www.telemedicus.info/urteile/All 
gemeines-Persoenlichkeitsrecht/Zitate/194-BVerfG-Az-1-BvR-18577-Eppler.html. 
67 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 185, translation at https://www.ge 
setze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html. Maunz/Dürig/Grabenwarter, 
81. Aufl. 2017, GG Art. 5, Abs. 1 Rn. 204–17. 
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reputation, negative depictions to others, and social standing.68  
Protection of the individual honor is governed by an objective 
standard.69  In addition to protection of the individual honor, the 
courts have come to recognize the right to informational self-
determination.70 
The general personality rights, functioning as lex generalis, 
take a subsidiary role when there is a more specific, pertinent 
statute, lex specialis.71  Before the general personality rights were 
recognized, there were, and still are, plenty of specific statutes, 
protecting particular aspects of the personality.72  One example of 
these specific rights is § 23 of the Art Copyright Code, which 
creates general permissions to display private individuals in 
narrow categories, such as depictions of “contemporary history,” 
or if they are appearing incidentally in public places.73  Further 
examples of specific personality protections include § 12 of the 
Civil Code,74 which provides injunctions for unauthorized usage 
of persons’ names (Namensrecht), § 11 of the Copyright Code,75 
which protects authors’ intellectual and personal relationships to 
their works, as well as a vast array of rights arising out of the 
German Privacy Code.76 
 
68 Rixecker in Säcker/Rixecker, Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 7. Aufl. 
2015, Anhang zu § 12, Rn. 78–79. 
69 Maunz, supra note 67. 
70 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 
419, 1983 (Ger.); see also Case C-131/12, Google v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos, (May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN (acknowledging Europeans’ right to be forgotten). 
71 Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generali, RECHTSLEXIKON.NET, http://www.rechtsl 
exikon.net/d/lex-specialis-derogat-legi-generali/lex-specialis-derogat-legi-
generali.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). 
72 Rixecker, supra note 68, at 83. 
73 KUNSTURHEBERGESETZ [KUNSTURHG] [ART COPYRIGHT ACT], Jan. 9, 1907, 
§ 23, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kunsturhg/__23.html (Ger.). 
74 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 12, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html. 
75 URHEBERPERSÖNLICHKEITSRECHT [URHG] [COPYRIGHT CODE], § 11, 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html 
#p0056. 
76 BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [BDSG] [GERMAN PRIVACY CODE], § 1, 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bdsg/englisch_bdsg.html# 
p0014. 
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B. The Three Spheres of Protection 
In every claim concerning the general personality rights, the 
courts must consider which “sphere” of the individual’s 
personality was affected by the content.77  Three spheres have 
been recognized: the “core sphere” (Intimsphäre), the “private 
sphere” (Privatsphäre), and the “social sphere” 
(Individualsphäre).78  They do not function as isolated categories, 
but, rather, as a continuum graduating the intensity of legal 
protection based on which sphere has been affected.79  In other 
words, the greater the intrusion into highly protected spheres, 
the greater requirement for protection of the affected legal rights 
and interests. 
The core sphere concerns the most fundamentally 
untouchable aspects of private life: those relating most directly to 
the Basic Law Article 1’s protection of human dignity.80  
Thoughts and feelings, content from personal journals and 
letters, or details of one’s sexuality generally fall within the core 
sphere.81  Principally, the core sphere receives such high 
protection that no intrusion can be legally justified.82 
In contrast to the core sphere’s extensive protections, the 
protections of the private sphere are not treated absolutely.83  
The private sphere concerns the personal life, which others may 
have limited access to.84  It can be thought of spatially; areas 
such as homes or partitioned-off areas of restaurants, where 
there is no expectation of being observed, correspond with the 
private sphere.85  Additionally, when private matters are brought 
into the public realm, they may then be considered within the 
 
77 BeckOGK/Specht, § 823 BGB, Rn. 1235–36 (describing generally the sphere 
theory, or Sphärentheorie). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1237. 
81 Id. at 1238. 
82 Id. at 1237. 
83 Id. at 1241. 
84 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Oct. 24, 1974, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 649, 650 (Ger.); KARL EGBERT WENZEL ET AL., 
DAS RECHT DER WORT- UND BILDBERICHTERSTATTUNG, HANDBUCH DES 
ÄUßERUNGSRECHTS 143–47 (4th ed. 1994); MATTHAIS PRINZ & BUTZ PETERS,  
MEDIENRECHT: DIE ZIVILRECHTLICHEN ANSPRÜCHE 73 (1999). 
85 BGH, Dec. 19, 1995, VI/ZR 15/95, https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bgh/1995-12-
19/vi-zr-15_95/. 
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protection of the private sphere.86  Intrusions into the private 
sphere will be counterbalanced by other countervailing rights, 
usually speech rights invoked by the speaker. 
Finally, there is the social sphere—the sphere in which the 
development of the individual personality comes into greatest 
contact with the outer world, particularly in work spaces and 
political fields.87  The general personality rights receive the least 
amount of protection in this sphere.88  When an individual places 
himself into the public, or involves himself in public matters, the 
balance between his personality rights and the other conflicting 
rights will usually come out in favor of the other rights.89  True 
published statements regarding an individual’s social sphere 
activities will usually receive greater weight than his personality 
rights, despite having a negative impact on his image.90  Due to 
the high legal standard, it is unlikely that one will recover 
pecuniary damages here.91 
IV. STATE ACTION IN FIGHTING FAKE NEWS 
A. Criminal Libel Statutes in the United States 
Convictions for criminal libel are extremely rare.92  While 
only a small minority of states have statutes establishing 
criminal liability for libel, its enforcement is even rarer; in the 
period between 1965 and 1996, there were only fifty-two 
prosecutions implemented, with only a fraction of these proving 
guilt.93  In the past, criminal libel prosecutions were more 
prevalent, but they met the stringent actual malice standard set 
 
86 BeckOGK, supra note 77, at 1243. 
87 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2012, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 771, Rn. 16 f, 2012 (Ger.). 
88 BeckOGK, supra note 77, at 1247. 
89 Id. at 1248. 
90 Bundesverfassungshericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 2016, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3362, Rn. 15, 2016 (Ger.) (permitting 
reviews in online review portals concerning services, so long as the entry into the 
social sphere does not extend any further than necessary, as measured by the 
general interest in the information being published). 
91 BeckOGK, supra note 77, at 1248. 
92 Edward L. Carter, Outlaw Speech on the Internet: Examining the Link 
Between Unique Characteristics of Online Media and Criminal Libel Prosecutions, 
21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 289, 296–97 (2005). 
93 Id. (noting the abuse of the statutes in that many of the implemented 
criminal libel prosecutions were against political rivals and journalists who 
questioned the actions of police, prosecutors, and politicians). 
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forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,94 where the Court 
struck down Louisiana’s criminal libel statute because it 
punished false statements made with mere common law malice.95  
Due to a wave of states either repealing or declaring such 
statutes unconstitutional following Garrison v. Louisiana, it was 
reported that only fourteen states had such statutes on the 
books, as of 2004.96 
B. Regulation of Obscenity and Other Content 
In Reno v. ACLU, the Court was faced with determining 
whether a federal obscenity statute was an intrusion of the First 
Amendment right to free speech.97  In striking down the statute, 
the Court explained that, rather than being a permissible time, 
place, or manner restriction on speech, the statute acted as a 
“content-based blanket restriction on speech . . . .”98  The Court 
also clearly stated that the Internet is a medium receiving 
complete First Amendment protection, as opposed to its 
predecessors, radio and television.99  Distinguishing the internet 
from these earlier media, the Court noted that “[e]ach medium of 
expression . . . may present its own problems,” thus justifying 
regulation for traditional broadcast media.100 
In 1997, when Reno was decided, the Court went to great 
lengths to explain how the Internet functions, mentioning that 
there were approximately 9.4 million host computers and forty 
 
94 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) 
(explaining actual malice standard in greater detail). 
95 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78. 
96 Carter, supra note 92, at 295–96. 
97 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)) 
(detailing the obscenity test as “(a) whether the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.”). 
98 Id. at 868. 
99 Id. at 869–70. 
100 Id. at 868–69 (quoting Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 
(1975)); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399–400 (1969) (detailing 
the extensive government regulation of radio and television broadcasts); Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637–38 (1994) (explaining that regulation of 
television was justified based on the scarcity of available frequencies at the 
technology’s inception); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 
(1989) (considering the “invasive” nature of particular media in determining its 
qualification for regulation). 
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million users at the time of the trial.101  Considering these 
numbers, the Court emphasized that there was neither a 
centralized organization controlling the internet, nor any 
centralized means of blocking material on the web.102  The nature 
of the Internet’s “vast democratic forums” was dispositive as to 
why the government supervision and regulation, which 
blanketed radio and television broadcasts, is virtually 
nonexistent in relation to the Internet.103  This 1997 decision goes 
to show the rapid pace at which technology is changing and 
demanding more change in the jurisprudence; if this case were to 
be argued today, the justices would be faced with a modern 
algorithm-based internet that is highly intrusive into peoples’ 
homes and communication devices. 
C. The Right to Anonymity in the United States 
In 1988, the state of Ohio created a law prohibiting the 
distribution of anonymous campaign literature with the purpose 
of identifying persons who distribute materials containing false 
statements, but the statute contained no language limiting its 
application to fraudulent, false, or libelous statements.104  Rather, 
the statute required disclosure for every political publication.105  
During that same year, a concerned citizen distributed a 
pamphlet regarding a local referendum on a school tax levy; it 
emphasized her views on a local school district vote, while not 
disclosing her identity.106 
The Supreme Court, stating that anonymous pamphleteering 
has an honorable tradition of political advocacy, ruled that Ohio’s 
statute was an unconstitutional blanket ban on a particular 
category of speech; the State may punish fraud directly, but, 
instead, took a “blunderbuss approach.”107 
 
101 Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. 
102 Id. at 853. 
103 Id. at 868–69 (mentioning as additional grounds for regulating radio and 
television, that they are substantially more “invasive” in peoples’ homes, and that 
internet content must be summoned and one typically does not encounter it “by 
accident”). 
104 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (West 2017); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 344 (1995). 
105 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (West 2017). 
106 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336. 
107 Id. at 357. 
FINAL_KRASKI 6/16/2018 11:24 AM 
938 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:923   
The McIntyre Court treated the identity of the speaker the 
same as the other contents within the document.108  It cited a 
former decision saying “[o]f course, the identity of the source is 
helpful in evaluating ideas.  But the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”109  Additionally, the Court expressed its belief that 
the common man should not be underestimated, that people are 
intelligent enough to evaluate anonymous writings, and, once 
having done so, they may determine for themselves what was 
written responsibly, truthfully, and what has value.110 
Based on these principles, social media users, as well as 
platform founders, in the United States are not required to 
disclose their identities.111 
D. German Speech-Related Criminal Codes 
German law may first approach cases of defamation, or other 
codified violations of personality rights, through an analysis of 
criminal liability.  To give a few examples, the German Criminal 
Code, in § 185, prohibits insults arising through either 
malfeasance or nonfeasance, affecting another’s moral, social, 
and intellectual dignity.112  The courts will make an initial 
determination as to whether the “insulting” content was a 
statement of fact or an opinion; for the purposes of analyzing fake 
news, only the statements of fact are relevant.  Furthermore, 
insulting statements of fact are actionable only when they are 
untrue and made directly to the person being insulted; thus, 
insult is a plausible cause of action for combating fake news 
stories.113  As mentioned above, § 823 paragraph 2 of the Civil 
Code enables civil recovery for the “breach of a statute that is  
 
 
108 Id. at 348. 
109 Id. at 348 n.11 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Id. at 348. 
111 Differences Between Public and Private Domain Registration, LINKEDIN (Dec. 
1, 2012), https://de.slideshare.net/virgomarble38/differences-between-public-and-priv 
ate-domain-registration (indicating that internet domain purchasers may avoid 
registration in a database by paying an extra “private registration” fee and providing 
an intermediary’s contact information. Furthermore, individuals may simply choose 
to submit false information; this is not prohibited by law). 
112 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 185, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.). 
113 Id. 
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intended to protect another person”; it is through this connection 
with § 823 paragraph 2 that the statutes in this section afford 
civil recovery.114 
Section 186 (Üble Nachrede) defines defamation as 
“assert[ing] or disseminat[ing] a fact related to another person 
which may defame him or negatively affect public opinion about 
him . . . .”115  Section 186 is fundamentally similar to the insult 
cause of action, except that the damaging statements in § 186 are 
published to a third party.116  Section 187 (Verleumdung) of the 
Criminal Code deals with aggravated cases, the cases where 
defamation occurs either intentionally or knowingly.117  
Defamation under § 187 requires the intentional or knowing 
dissemination of an untrue fact that defames another person, 
negatively affects public opinion about him, or endangers his 
creditworthiness.118 
Interestingly, the German criminal punishments for 
defamation of politicians have an inverted policy of the broad 
protections of political speech in the United States.  The United 
States Supreme Court made it more difficult for public figures to 
sue on speech-based claims, because “First Amendment freedoms 
need breathing space to survive,” and it wished not to chill 
valuable political speech.119  Under the German Criminal Code, 
 
114 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, para. 2, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (Ger.). 
115  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 186, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.) (establishing a maximum 
penalty of a fine and one year imprisonment; the penalties may be elevated if the 
defamatory statement “was committed publicly or through the dissemination of 
writings”; truth is also a defense). 
116 Dinah Busse, Straftaten gegen die Ehre – Beleidigung, Üble Nachrede, 
Verleumdung: §§ 185-187 StGB, GANGWAY (Mar. 28, 2016), http://gangway.de/straft 
aten-gegen-die-ehre-beleidigung-ueble-nachrede-verleumdung-%C2%A7%C2%A7-
185-187-stgb/. 
117 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 187, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.); see STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL 
CODE], § 11, para. 3, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch 
_stgb/ (Ger.) (including “audiovisual media, data storage media, illustrations and 
other depictions” in the definition of “writings”). 
118 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 187, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.) (establishing a maximum penalty of a 
fine and two years imprisonment; “if the act was committed publicly, in a meeting or 
through dissemination of written materials . . . [with] imprisonment not exceeding 
five years or a fine”). 
119 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
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§ 188 establishes liability for defamation of people “in the 
political arena” if the offense burdens his public activities.120  
When done in the context of § 186 defamation, a defendant shall 
be sentenced to three months to five years imprisonment.121  In 
the aggravated sense of § 187, when done intentionally, the term 
of imprisonment is between six months and five years.122 
Finally, Germany is much more willing to implement bans 
on content regarding its national socialist past.  Certain political 
parties and their associated symbols have been made strictly 
illegal.123  Furthermore, one specific bit of content, Holocaust 
denial or diminution, is strictly prohibited.124  While it is 
necessary for this speech, symbolism, or propaganda to be 
distributed in Germany to be subject to prosecution, even persons 
outside of Germany could be prosecuted if their content is found 
within Germany.125 
E. Anonymity in Germany 
The vast network of German privacy law guarantees 
extensive privacy rights to individuals on social media.  For 
example, the German Teleservices Act (“TMG”) requires internet 
service providers to provide anonymous access to their service, to 
the furthest technological extent possible.126  A 2014 Federal 
Supreme Court decision further restricted civil claimants’ access 
to defendants’ information, not permitting them to obtain others’ 
personal data unless fitting within the narrow parameters of the 
 
120 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 188, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.). 
121 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 188, para. 1, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.). 
122 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 188, para. 2, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.). 
123 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 21, para. 2, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/; STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], 
§ 188, para. 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ 
(Ger.). 
124  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130, translation at https://www. 
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (Ger.). 
125 Andreas Stegbauer, The Ban of Right-Wing Extremist Symbols According to 
Section 86a of the German Criminal Code, 8 GERMAN L.J. 173, 18182 (2007); see 
also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 12, 2000, 1 StR, 2000, 
184/00 (sentencing defendant to ten months imprisonment for Holocaust denial on 
an Australian-based website). 
126 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 179, 
§ 13, para. 6, sentence 1 (Ger.). 
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TMG.127  When plaintiffs file for injunctions against internet 
service providers to provide personal information, the other 
parties’ identities may only be released for purposes of criminal 
law enforcement or in instances where they have contractually 
waived protection.128  Without one of these elements present, 
internet service providers have no authority to convey personal 
information, even for civil claims for injury to personality 
rights.129  Thus, since many of the violations of personal rights 
are also actionable crimes, one can go to the police or state 
prosecutor, make a criminal complaint, and ascertain the 
infringer’s identity through these means.130  Despite the difficulty 
in determining specific content creators, German law requires 
online providers to identify themselves, thus breaking down one 
link in the chain of anonymous speech.131 
V. PRIVATE CLAIMS IN FIGHTING FAKE NEWS 
A. Speech Regarding Private Matters 
Tort law, particularly speech-based causes of action under 
tort, comes into direct conflict with the U.S. Constitution’s 
fundamental rights.  Defamation, particularly the attempt to 
weigh states’ interests against the protections afforded by the 
First Amendment, has become a focal point in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.  The states’ interests, in terms of 
defamation, consist of providing damages—general, special, or 
punitive—to individuals whose reputations were damaged 
through false statements.  Traditionally, the people making these 
“defamatory” statements have used the First Amendment as a 
shield, in order to protect themselves from state-sanctioned  
 
 
127 BGH, July 1, 2014, VI ZR 345/13, https://openjur.de/u/705049.html. 
128 TMG, § 14, para. 2; TMG, § 15, para. 5, sentence 4; BGH, July 1, 2014, VI ZR 
345/13, https://openjur.de/u/705049.html. 
129 BGH, July 1, 2014, VI ZR 345/13, https://openjur.de/u/705049.html. 
130 David Geßner, Ansprüche bei Verletzung des allgemeinen 
Persönlichkeitsrechts, DAVID GEßNER RECHTSANWALT (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.re 
chtsanwalt-gessner-berlin.de/ansprueche-bei-verletzung-des-persoenlichkeitsrechts/. 
131 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 179, § 5 
(Ger.); Rundfunkstaatsvertrag [RSTV] [INTERSTATE BROADCASTING AGREEMENT], 
July 31, 1991, § 55 para. 2, http://www.dvtm.net/fileadmin/pdf/gesetze/13._RStV.pdf 
(requiring all providers, including website creators, to list a name, address, tax 
identification number, and other information on their Impressum pages). 
FINAL_KRASKI 6/16/2018 11:24 AM 
942 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:923   
remedies.  Defamation remedies arose under common law and 
came into their modern form through a number of notable 
Supreme Court decisions. 
Until the 1960s, defamation law in the United States was 
almost exclusively assumed by state courts and legislatures.132  
State libel laws often required a defamed individual to merely 
prove that there had been a written false publication that 
subjected him or her “to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”133  Truth 
served as an absolute defense to claims of defamation; but, if the 
published statements were determined to be false, there was 
then a presumption of general injury to plaintiffs’ reputations.134  
The common law presumed general damages because “in many 
cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and 
indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof 
in loss to the person defamed.”135  In addition to presumed 
general damages, plaintiffs could also prove pecuniary loss or 
emotional distress to recover special damages, as well as common 
law malice to recover punitive damages.  Defendants, on the 
other hand, were permitted to prove that their statements 
inflicted no reputational injury.  However, a showing of this still 
would not preclude an award of nominal damages in any case of 
defamation per se.136 
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, made a ground-breaking decision, overturning 200 
years of libel law.137  The Court ruled that “public officials,” suing 
on a claim for libel, could not satisfy their burden of proof by 
proving that there was a false and damaging publication, or the 
traditional common law requirements.138  Rather, a public official 
 
132 Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 (1985) 
(White, J., concurring). 
133 Id. Different from libel laws, slanderous statements were actionable per se 
only when they imputed “a criminal offense, a venereal or loathsome and 
communicable disease, improper conduct of a lawful business, or unchastity of a 
woman.” Id. at 766 n.1. All other slanderous statements, outside of these narrow per 
se categories, were actionable only with proof of special damages, often taking the 
form of material or pecuniary loss. 
134 Id. at 765. 
135 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1938)). 
136 Id. at 765; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1938) (noting that nominal damages primarily serve to vindicate plaintiffs by 
branding information false). 
137 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 766 (White, J., concurring) (citing N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)). 
138 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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would be barred from recovering damages, whether they be 
presumed, special or punitive, unless he were to prove “actual 
malice.”139  The Court defined malice as a knowing falsehood or a 
reckless disregard for the truth.140  If a public official, as a 
plaintiff, could overcome this very high standard of proof, he 
would then be able to recover whichever special damages that he 
was capable of proving; this would also allow him to request 
punitive damages.141  New York Times was the first time that the 
Court ventured to constitutionalize the areas of libel and slander; 
this was based on its belief that the First Amendment required 
special protection for the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open 
debate on public issues.”142 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.,143 the Court was faced with a 
defamation action made by a private individual over statements 
of public or general interest.144  The Court held that these private 
individuals may not recover damages by only proving a false 
statement, regardless of how damaging it was to their 
reputation.145  Rather, they must prove the additional element of 
“fault,” which, at a minimum, requires a showing of negligence.146  
Even when reaching this evidentiary threshold, damages must be 
proven, as opposed to the common law rule allowing them to be 
presumed.147  And finally, the Gertz Court required that even 
these private individuals must satisfy the strenuous New York 
Times actual malice standard in order to recover punitive 
damages.148  While Gertz gave the states guidance on defamatory 
statements of public or general interest, and how public figures 
should be distinguished from private figures, many questions 
still remained, especially in the area of private speech. 
 
 
 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 766 (White, J., concurring). 
142 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 
270); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending the 
actual malice standard to all “public figures”). 
143 418 U.S. 323, 323 (1974). 
144 Id. at 332. 
145 Id. at 347–48. 
146 Id. at 347. 
147 Id. at 349. 
148 Id. at 350. 
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The Supreme Court, in the 1985 case Dun & Bradstreet Inc. 
v. Greenmoss Builders, was once again faced with speech by 
private individuals on matters of purely private concern.149  After 
a credit reporting agency sent a report to five of its subscribers, 
falsely reporting that a particular construction contractor had 
filed for bankruptcy, the credit reporting agency attempted to 
issue a corrective notice.150  Because the report was false and so 
grossly misrepresentative of the contractor’s finances, it brought 
a defamation action where a jury awarded presumed, special, 
and punitive damages at the trial level.151  The Supreme Court, 
in a plurality opinion, ruled that “[i]n light of the reduced 
constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public 
concern . . . the state interest adequately supports awards of 
presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of 
actual malice.”152 
B. Speech Regarding Public Matters 
In distinguishing whether speech is of public or private 
concern, the Court has generally defined speech on matters of 
public concern as speech “fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community[.]”153  
Furthermore, it may be of public concern when the subject is of 
general interest and there is a value to the public.154  In 
determining if speech is on a matter of public concern, the 
“inappropriate or controversial character” of the speech is 
irrelevant.155  In further analyzing this type of issue, the Court 
must examine the content, form, and context of the speech.156  No 
particular factor in this analysis is dispositive, and the court 
shall consider “what was said, where it was said, and how it was  
 
 
149 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 752. 
152 Id. at 761–63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on the distinction 
that the speech at issue, similar to advertising, was motivated by a desire for profit 
and that there would be no societal value in false reporting to creditors). 
153 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
154 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004). 
155 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987). 
156 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011). 
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said.”157  This thorough analysis of the surrounding facts ensures 
that a trial court’s “judgment does not constitute a forbidden 
intrusion on the field of free expression.”158 
C. Other Causes of Action Found in the United States 
Similar to and often accompanying a defamation claim, is the 
tort of false light invasion of privacy. In order to satisfy a claim 
for false light, one must show that the defendant published 
something about the plaintiff, it portrayed the plaintiff in a false 
or misleading light, it was highly offensive or embarrassing to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, and it was published 
with at least reckless disregard.159  Take, for example, a 
newspaper publishing an article concerning child abuse in the 
Catholic Church, and its inclusion of a photo of a priest who, in 
fact, was completely innocent; despite there being no words 
directly accusing the priest of partaking in child abuse, the 
innuendo suffices to support a claim for false light. 
False light cases protect plaintiffs from invasions of their 
privacy from misleading assertion, innuendos, and implications 
that are proven to be sufficiently false.160  This cause of action is 
very fact-specific; it will not be satisfied when the false statement 
is shown to be immaterial, or if it would be perceived as 
“inherently incredible” to an ordinary person.161  Some 
jurisdictions require that the publication constitute a private 
intrusion to the subject, not some matter of his public life.162 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) is treated 
as a “gap-filler” tort, providing a cause of action for particularly 
egregious conduct not covered by other torts.163  This cause of 
action seeks to provide recovery for injury to plaintiffs’ mental 
and emotional well beings; because of the absence of physical 
 
157 Id. at 454. 
158 Id. at 453 (citation omitted). 
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 651 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Russell G. 
Donaldson, Annotation, False Light Invasion of Privacy—Congnizability and 
Elements, 57 A.L.R.4th 22 § 4[a] (1987) (noting that all false light causes of action 
arise from state statutory or common law). 
160 Donaldson, supra note 159, §§ 14–16. 
161 Id. § 17. 
162 Id. §§ 10–11. 
163 Catherine Palo, Annotation, Proof of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, 136 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 175 § 2 (2013). 
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injury, IIED claims are “not favored in the law.”164  Following the 
extreme and outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must prove that 
the harm is severe.165  The “extreme and outrageous” element 
requires that the actor go beyond all limitations of decency and 
that his actions are atrocious and intolerable by community 
standards.166  Along with the above-mentioned causes of action, 
states have provided a number of other causes of action to protect 
privacy rights; unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of 
another, appropriation of another’s name or likeness, and 
unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life.167 
Outside of protecting peoples’ privacy, most states’ laws also 
afford a remedy for trade libel or commercial disparagement.168  
This cause of action requires a showing that a false statement 
was published with the intent to inflict pecuniary harm to 
another person’s interests and that the statement was either 
known to have been false or the speaker acted in reckless 
disregard of its falsity.169  Trade libel is distinguished from 
defamation because it requires the plaintiff to prove special 
damages by showing pecuniary loss, and does not permit 
immaterial damage elements, such as mental anguish.170  In 
cases where the remarks exceed criticism of the plaintiff’s goods 
and go further to imply business dishonesty, or that the plaintiff 
is incompetent, the plaintiff may sue for defamation.171  In fact, a 
libel claim is strategically preferable because it does not require 
proof of special damages.172 
 
 
164 Id. (providing examples of IIED, such as desecrating a corpse or otherwise 
behaving outrageously at a funeral or burial). 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
166 Andrews v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc., No. 7:11CV00037, 2013 
WL 3324227, at *15 (W.D. Va. July 1, 2013). 
167 Donaldson, supra note 159, § 10. 
168 Id. § 11(f). 
169 Id. 
170 Guess, Inc. v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
171 See Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co., 86 P.2d 696, 702 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939). 
172 Erlich v. Etner, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258–59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) 
(describing the difficulty for a plaintiff to satisfy a trade libel claim by having to 
identify particular customers who have refrained from dealing with him, along with 
specific instances of lost transactions). 
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VI. NOTES ON PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES 
For both domestic and foreign social media users, any claims 
against them can be based upon personal jurisdiction, having 
sufficient minimum contacts within a jurisdiction, or a state’s 
long-arm statute, creating personal jurisdiction for out-of-state 
acts.  For claims arising under federal law, usually related to 
election, intellectual property, or commercial trade issues, the 
federal courts may even exercise jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants with a showing that their contacts with the United 
States are sufficient to bring a defendant into court.173 
A. Preliminary Discovery 
Social media usage, especially its anonymity, has stirred 
controversy in the pleadings phase of defamation cases.  
Unaware of the online defamer’s identity, plaintiffs are filing 
“John Doe” lawsuits with increasing frequency.174  When a 
defamed plaintiff seeks to discover the identity of his defamer, he 
will have to satisfy a jurisdiction-specific test in order for a court 
to mandate an internet service provider to disclose a user’s 
information.175  As an example, some courts have chosen to follow 
the New Jersey Superior Court’s requirement that a plaintiff: 
(1) make efforts to give online notice to the anonymous poster 
that he may be subject to a subpoena or application for order of 
disclosure, (2) directly quote the actionable online speech, 
(3) present evidence for a prima facie cause of action on the 
claims, and (4) make an argument to the court that the weight of 
the prima facie claims outweigh the poster’s First Amendment 
anonymous speech protections.176 
 
173 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2); see also Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (exercising 4(k)(2) jurisdiction over Osama bin Laden). 
174 Jason C. Miller, Who's Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public 
and Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online 
Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 229, 242–43 (2008). 
175 Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First 
Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and 
Election Speech, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 92, 114 (2012). 
176 Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
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B. The Availability of Injunctions 
Injunctions, being equitable, not legal remedies, are 
generally not available in defamation cases for a number of 
important reasons.  When an adequate legal remedy, such as 
damages, can be afforded, equitable remedies, such as 
injunctions, are precluded.177  A number of courts have also 
denied the equitable remedy of an injunction because, they 
suggest, there may be a number of factual questions that should 
be determined by a jury; an equitable remedy, in these cases, 
would deprive the defendant of his Seventh Amendment right to 
a trial by jury.178  And, perhaps most importantly, court orders 
permanently enjoining speech are prior restraints on speech, 
subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny.179 
C. The Communications Decency Act 
In other types of traditional media, media entities could be 
subject to liability for publishing and furthering a defamatory 
statement made by another party.180  This concept applies to 
newspapers, book publishers, and broadcasters and does not have 
the same application to social media.181  Congress passed § 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which protects social 
networks from liability if: (1) the defendant is a “provider or user 
of an interactive computer service”; (2) the complaint seeks to 
hold the defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker”; and (3) the 
action is based on “information provided by another information 
content provider.”182  A benefit of the CDA is that it prevents the 
“chilling effect that regulation may have on internet speech.”183  
 
177 W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Injunction as Remedy Against Defamation of 
Person, 47 A.L.R.2d 715 § 4(a) (1956). 
178 Id. § 5(b). 
179 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). But see W. Willow 
Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 870, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199–200 (Sup. Ct. 
Rockland Cnty. 1960) (allowing injunctions in cases of fraud, other violations of the 
law, or egregious intrusions into others’ property rights). 
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (extending 
liability to third persons who deliver or transmit defamatory matter, while knowing 
of, or having constructive knowledge of its defamatory character). 
181 Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look 
Like in the Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 430, 466 (2013). 
182 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). 
183 Angelotti, supra note 181, at 485 (quoting Allison E. Horton, Note, Beyond 
Control?: The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1265, 1305 (2009)). 
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And because Twitter and other social media outlets are 
identifiable as “provider[s] of [an] interactive computer service,” 
they receive complete immunity from defamation suits over 
content created by their users.184 
D. SLAPP Actions 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP 
suits”) refer to instances of aggressive plaintiffs suing individuals 
or groups to wrongfully deter their speech on public issues.185  
These occur in instances where people rightfully criticize other 
parties regarding public issues, then plaintiffs with disparate 
resources seek to silence defendants who will likely not have the 
resources to represent themselves from defamation claims.186  In 
a recent phenomenon, thirty-one states have created “anti-
SLAPP” statutes, aiming to abate meritless lawsuits, which tend 
to chill constitutionally protected speech.187  The anti-SLAPP 
statutes vary in substance and scope in every jurisdiction but 
they generally seek to reimburse lawyer’s fees and institute court 
sanctions. 
VII. GERMAN CIVIL LIABILITY AND DAMAGES 
Defamation claims in Germany are initially analyzed 
similarly to those in the United States:  the courts first seek to 
make the crucial determination of whether the statements in 
question are statements of fact or statements of opinion.188  When 
 
184 Id. at 487 n.349 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012)); see, e.g., Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997) (prohibiting recovery against 
interactive computer service provider for negligent distribution of defamatory 
material on internet bulletin board, because CDA precludes recovery against 
defendants who are not publishers or speakers), aff’d 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
185 Rodney A. Smolla, Annotation, § 9:107. SLAPP Suits and Anti-SLAPP 
Legislation, 2 L. OF DEFAMATION § 9:107 (2d ed. 2017). 
186 Id. 
187 State Anti-Slapp Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-
slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (noting that 
Colorado and West Virginia have similar speech protections arising from their 
common law); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2017). 
188 Gregory J. Thwaite & Wolfgang Brehm, German Privacy and Defamation 
Law: The Right To Publish in the Shadows of the Right to Human Dignity, 8 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 336, 343–44 (1994) (explaining that while the analysis of 
statements of fact and opinion is similar in both countries, the actual analysis of 
whether a statement is defamatory “plays a more subordinate role in German 
practice”). Bruns, supra note 9, at 283–84. 
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the statement is found to be a mere expression of opinion, the 
Basic Law Article 5(1)’s Free Speech Clause will provide 
protection from liability.189  Only in the rare case of malicious 
insult (Schmähkritik) can a statement of opinion be legally 
actionable.190  If a statement is determined to have been a 
statement of fact, on the other hand, then the court will go on to 
make the further determination as to whether the plaintiff can 
adequately prove its falsity.191 
In cases of defamatory publications, there is a duty to 
conduct a reasonable investigation on the subject matter being 
published.192  Even if a defendant were to publish a defamatory 
statement of fact, it could be privileged if the defendant 
undertook a reasonable investigation.193  As for other significant 
differences between the two systems, there is no distinction 
between libel and slander in Germany and presumed damages 
are not available; plaintiffs may only recover actual, specifically-
proven damages of economic loss.194 
Section 823 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code establishes 
compensatory liability for infringements against the general 
personality rights.195  Section 823, paragraph 2 extends this civil 
liability to those in “breach of a statute that is intended to protect 
another person.”196  Though, as a limitation in these particular 
cases, if the statute strictly prohibits certain behavior—
regardless of fault—fault must still be established in order to 
recover compensatory damages.197  Furthermore, § 824 of the 
Civil Code extends civil liability to the untruthful dissemination 
of a fact causing harm to another’s credit or livelihood.198 
 
189 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 5, para. 1, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/; see Bruns, supra note 9, at 286. 
190 Bruns, supra note 9, at 286. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 286–87. 
195 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, para. 1, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (Ger.); see 
also Bruns, supra note 9, at 285–86 (describing these as “constitutionally granted 
personality right[s]”). 
196 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, para. 2, translation 
at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (Ger.). 
197 Id. 
198 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 824, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (Ger.) (providing 
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Injunction and deletion of published material, another 
fundamental civil remedy in conjunction with § 823 damages, 
may also be sought by plaintiffs; § 1004 of the Civil Code 
establishes that “[i]f the ownership is interfered with . . . the 
owner may require the disturber to remove the interference.  If 
further interferences are to be feared, the owner may seek a 
prohibitory injunction.”199  Prohibitory injunctions are only 
available upon full adjudication and a court’s final judgment, 
whereas temporary injunctions may be issued in the time leading 
up to litigation.200  While this facially applies to impairments of 
physical property rights, the courts have extended § 1004 
injunctions to instances where the general personality rights are 
affected as well.201  An injunction may be issued in a broad 
spectrum of instances, including: deliberately untrue or 
incomplete reports affecting an individual’s honor, other 
damaging statements, extreme criticism, unauthorized or 
manipulated photography, and other intrusions into individuals’ 
privacy.202 
In 1958, the Federal Supreme Court made another landmark 
ruling in the Herrenreiter decision.203  The case concerned the 
usage of a well-known equestrian’s image by the producer of an 
aphrodisiac in an advertising poster.204  The plaintiff, claimed 
that the poster’s usage of his image subjected him to ridicule and 
humiliation, but he did not suffer any tangible pecuniary loss.205  
The Court, in reaffirming previous cases’ implementation of civil 
liability for general personality rights, extended this liability to 
immaterial damage.206  The Herrenreiter Court addressed 
protection of the “inner realm of the personality,” the individual’s 
 
an exception for individuals who have a justified interest in making such 
communications). 
199 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 1004, para. 1, 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html 
(Ger.). 
200 Thwaite & Brehm, supra note 188, at 349 (noting the courts’ hesitancy to 
grant injunctions preventing the initial publication of possibly defamatory material 
due to the lack of available information as well as the high probability that it is 
conflicting with the Basic Law). 
201 HK-BGB/Hans Schulte-Nölke, 9. Aufl. 2016, BGB § 1004 Rn. 1–13 (citing 
Kommentar zum BGB/Jauernig, 16. Aufl. 2015, BGB § 823 Rn. 64–91). 
202 MüKoBGB/Baldus, 7. Aufl. 2017, BGB § 1004 Rn. 32–33. 
203 26 BGHZ 349 (Ger.). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
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basis for his self-determination, and explained that its protection 
“would be in great part illusory” without compensation for 
immaterial damages; thus, such damages were allowed.207  The 
Herrenreiter Court also took the opportunity to extend “by 
analogy” pain and suffering damages to infringements of the 
general personality rights.208 
A. German Procedure and Remedies: The Pretrial Discovery 
Void 
Pretrial discovery is not available to German plaintiffs, so 
they must use other means to gather information in preparation 
of bringing a claim.  A common method is to commence a 
separate action for information.209  Another option is the so-called 
“step-action” (Stufenklage) where the request for information is 
filed alongside a claim for a particular remedy.210  The step-action 
approach shares some similarities with the U.S. system in that 
there is a procedural bifurcation where the basis for the evidence 
is first argued, and, following its admission, the courts proceed on 
the merits of the underlying claim.211 
Seeking other’s information can also face the hurdle imposed 
by the data protection and media codes of the sixteen German 
States (Bundesländer).212  The aforementioned right to 
informational self-determination has come to set a baseline 
standard of data protection.213  Because the right to informational 
self-determination protects an individual’s right to know who 
possesses his information, and to what extent, the courts will 
have to balance the constitutional value of disbursing defendants’ 
information against the interest of facilitating a defamation or 
other claim.214  Unlike in the United States, plaintiffs are not 
 
207 Id. 
208 Id.; BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 253, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (Ger.). 
209 Bruns, supra note 9, at 293; BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL 
CODE], § 666, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisc 
h_bgb.html#p2917 (Ger.). 
210 Bruns, supra note 9, at 293 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE CODE], § 254, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch 
_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p0939 (Ger.)). 
211 Bruns, supra note 9, at 293. 
212 Id. at 294. 
213 See BVerfG, 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83, Dec. 15, 1983, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv065001.html. 
214 Id. 
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required to present a prima facie case, but only to demonstrate 
the reasonable plausibility that the alleged defamatory 
statement is false.215 
B. Lawyer’s Fees 
One can draw a large distinction between the allocation of 
lawyers’ fees in Germany and the United States.  Germany’s 
“loser pays” system requires that the unsuccessful civil litigant 
compensate the other party for their statutory costs and fees.216  
It is generally agreed that the loser-pays principle reduces 
frivolous law suits.217  The principle also makes it more 
economically viable to institute meritorious small claims, which 
would otherwise go unaddressed due to their prohibitory legal 
costs.218  This system is particularly well suited for Germany, 
where lawyer’s fees are established by statute.219  As another 
fundamental contrast to the U.S. system, German law does not 
allow for attorneys to collect contingency fees.220  While 
contingency fee agreements provide incentives for U.S. lawyers to 
push for the best possible outcome for their clients, they also 
disincentivize attorneys from taking on small claims cases.  
Thus, the German statutory scheme of loser pays provides for 
better economic incentives when dealing with smaller potential 
claims. 
 
 
215 Id. 
216 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 91, 788, 
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ (Ger.). 
217 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59–60 
(1982). 
218 Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of A "Loser Pays" Rule on the American 
Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 567, 583 (2011). 
219 RECHTSANWALTSVERGÜTUNGSGESETZ [RVG] [ATTORNEY REMUNERATION 
LAW], May 5, 2004, BGBL I at 3799, § 2 (Ger.); see also 
RECHTSANWALTSVERGÜTUNGSGESETZ [RVG] [ATTORNEY REMUNERATION LAW], May 
5, 2004, BGBL I at 3799, § 3 (Ger.) (indicating that lawyers are permitted to 
negotiate higher fees). 
220 BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG [BRAO] [FEDERAL ATTORNEYS CODE], 
Jan. 8, 1959, BGBL I at 3618, § 49 (Ger.). 
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C. Determining the Proper Defendant 
The German Teleservices Act functions similarly to the CDA 
with regards to liability for service providers.  It states that 
service providers are only responsible for the content that they 
generate and they are not obliged to actively monitor and 
investigate any information transmitted through or stored on 
their platforms.221  Here is where the similarities end; once a 
German service provider is notified of unlawful content, it must 
take immediate action to remove or block it.  Failure to do so can 
require an injunction or even possibly damages against the 
service provider.222 
In response to the Syrian refugee case and sensational 
stories of Fake News during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
German politicians hurried to pass the Network Enforcement 
Act.223  Recently going into effect, it requires the immediate 
removal of any “hate crime and other illegal content” by service 
providers.224  A failure to delete flagged “obviously illegal content” 
within twenty-four hours could result in fines in excess of fifty 
million Euros.225  The Network Enforcement Act, which requires 
social networks to determine the truth as well as the legality of 
content, has naturally been met with heavy criticism and is 
certain to face scrutiny in the courts.226 
CONCLUSION 
With such a broad array of available legal options, most fake 
news publications still go unchecked.  As seen in the case of the 
Syrian refugee, fighting fake news in social media can be 
compared to falling into a quicksand pit; the harder you push to 
 
221 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 179, § 7 
(Ger.). 
222 LG Würzburg, Judgment, July 3, 2017, 11 O 2338/16 UVR, http://www. 
gesetze-bayern.de/Content/Document/Y-300-Z-BECKRS-B-2017-N-103822?hl=true& 
AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (Ger.) (noting disparity on the availability of 
injunctions between the German and European jurisprudence, but nonetheless 
advising that the German jurisprudence be followed). 
223 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NETZDG] [NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT], 
Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL I at 3352 (Ger.). 
224 Josie Le Blond, In Germany, A Battle Against Fake News Stumbles into Legal 
Controversy, STOP FAKE (June 2, 2017, 4:32PM), http://www.stopfake.org/en/in-
germany-a-battle-against-fake-news-stumbles-into-legal-controversy/. 
225 Id. (allowing a seven-day period to delete infringing content that is not so 
clear as to its legality, thus requiring more time for consideration). 
226 Id. 
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get out, the deeper you sink.  The young refugee’s lawsuit only 
served to further publicize the original lies that had caused him 
reputational harm.  With the intention of avoiding this 
“quicksand phenomenon,” the owners of Comet Ping Pong 
pizzeria have, at least until now, declined to pursue a legal 
remedy.227 
This Article demonstrated the unique approaches in the 
United States and in Germany for fighting fake news:  The U.S. 
remedies tend to wait for an injury, then compensate for it, 
whereas Germany is much more willing to directly address the 
speech’s content and provide other remedies.  Due to the 
difficulty in identifying online speakers, both systems often fall 
short in providing remedies for injured reputations, among the 
numerous other injuries.  Speech-related law was transformed 
following the invention of the printing press and radio and 
television.  Similarly, the recent social media revolution will also 
require a suitable legal evolution. 
 
 
227 Benjamin Freed, Comet Ping Pong Has Legal Options, But They Won’t Make 
“Pizzagate” Go Away, WASHINGTONIAN (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonian. 
com/2016/12/09/comet-ping-pong-has-legal-options-but-they-wont-make-pizzagate-
go-away-entirely/. 
